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Abstract 
Why do countries contribute troops to UN peacekeeping? Recognizing the incentives to free 
ride on the contributions of other countries, existing explanations have tended to focus on the 
private benefits of providing troops. There has been particular emphasis on some major 
contributing countries that gain financially from providing peacekeepers. An alternative 
explanation could be that countries prefer to deploy troops to peacekeeping alongside 
countries with similar foreign policy preferences in order to maximize jointly-produced 
private benefits. Accordingly, the willingness to provide peacekeepers should depend on 
which other countries are providing troops to peacekeeping operations. The implications are 
explored within the context of games on networks, and it is demonstrated that in equilibrium 
countries that are more Bonacich central in the network of foreign policy preference 
contribute disproportionally to UN peacekeeping. Based on actual contributions to UN 
peacekeeping from 1990 until 2011, we find that policy complementarities explain why 
countries provide a larger proportion of peacekeepers to a particular mission. Importantly, 
centrality in the network of policy complementarities matters and not simply that countries 
have moderate policy preferences. There is robust evidence for the prevalence of 
peacekeeping alongside your ‘friends’; in effect, countries with a lot of ‘friends’ contribute 
more peacekeepers. 
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Introduction  
When raising money for charitable purposes, churches and rotary clubs regularly organize 
events where members are encouraged to give because they observe their friends doing the 
same. Besides peer pressure, the success of such events derives from the enjoyment to be had 
from doing things together; for example, when neighborhood organizations pick litter or look 
after community gardens. Peer pressure via social networks also contributes to turnout in 
elections (Abrams, Iversen & Soskice, 2011). In this case, an additional element is that 
people with similar political views are particularly relevant. We argue that benefits from 
peacekeeping alongside countries with similar foreign policy preferences can similarly 
explain why countries contribute troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN 
PKOs). 
 
There is a renewed scholarly interest in peacekeeping, where recent research has emphasized 
their importance in stabilizing post-conflict situations (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 
2008; Ruggeri, Gizelis & Dorussen, 2013) as well as their relevance for protecting civilians 
(Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013). Over the last 30 years, peacekeeping has evolved 
from ‘traditional’ to ‘new’ peacekeeping (Ratner, 1995): peacekeepers are now more likely to 
be deployed to civil wars rather than interstate conflict, more often authorized to use force, 
and tend to operate under broader and more demanding mandates (Heldt & Wallensteen, 
2006). These developments have not only led to the deployment of a larger number of 
peacekeepers—from about 10,000 in 1985 to more than 100,000 in 2014—but also to their 
deployment into more risky environments. Fortna (2008) and Sambanis & Doyle (2007) note 
that peacekeepers are regularly deployed to so-called ‘hard cases’, while Ruggeri, Dorussen 
& Gizelis (2012) detail their deployment to local conflict hot spots. Ruggeri, Gizelis & 
Dorussen (2013) and Dorussen & Gizelis (2014) examine the interaction between 
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peacekeepers and the local population and find evidence of cooperation but also conflict. The 
UN Secretary General faces with an increasingly daunting task, namely to find adequate 
numbers of sufficiently competent peacekeeping troops to be deployed into risky situations, 
making it germane to examine why countries contribute troops to peacekeeping operations.1 
 
Contributing to peacekeeping operations may yield a combination of public and private 
benefits (Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu 1999; Bobrow &Boyer, 1997; Bove & Elia, 2014). 
Peacekeeping provides public goods for the international community if it enhances 
international security through monitoring peace agreements and stabilizing post-conflict 
societies. It also contributes to upholding international norms in (post-)conflict situations, 
such as the responsibility to protect, human rights and transitional justice, and gender 
equality. Well-known collective action problems affect the provision of such public goods 
(Olson, 1965). Countries have incentives to free ride on the contributions of other countries 
leading to an underprovision of peacekeepers and inequitable burden-sharing (Olson & 
Zeckhauser, 1966; Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998; 1999). Apart from obvious concerns 
about potential lack of peacekeepers, peacekeeping is more valuable to the international 
community if it is seen as a global responsibility with a fair sharing of the burden rather than 
a hegemonic imposition of values. Observing an increased tendency of a small number of 
countries to shoulder the financial burden of peacekeeping, Shimizu & Sandler (2002: 666) 
conclude: “The reliance on a few hegemons to keep the peace comes at a price as these 
‘larger shareholders’ in peacekeeping operations pursue an agenda in keeping with their 
preferences.” 
 
In joint-production models contributions to the public good simultaneously yield private 
benefits (Cornes & Sandler, 1984). Because operations are located in a specific geographic 
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region, the stability provided by peacekeeping can be treated as an impure public good, more 
beneficial for countries in the same region or with region-specific interests (Bobrow & Boyer, 
1997: 727). Peacekeepers thus deliver public goods for the whole international community 
while also securing private, country-specific, benefits. A large number of participating 
countries however may crowd out any advantage for a particular country. In joint-production 
models, positive contributions can occur in equilibrium even though public-good elements 
still incentivize countries to contribute less the more others contribute. Empirical evidence 
suggests that jointly-produced benefits matter for the provision of peacekeepers (Khanna, 
Sandler & Shimizu, 1999; Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009; Bove & Elia, 2014). 
  
Others simply consider private, in particular financial, benefits as the primary motivation for 
providing peacekeepers. UN funding for peacekeepers exceeds the cost of providing troops 
for most poorer member countries, making it profitable for them to deploy peacekeepers. 
Financial incentives have often been suggested as the primary motivation behind the large 
number of peacekeepers from countries like India, Bangladesh, and Nepal. Furthermore, the 
deployment of peacekeepers may provide troops with valuable operational experience.  
 
Peacekeeping alongside countries with similar foreign policy preferences provides benefits so 
far unacknowledged in the literature on the economics of peacekeeping. Moreover, once this 
is brought into focus an alternative explanation of why some states make disproportionate 
contributions can be construed. By definition public-goods benefits are independent of what 
particular countries are contributing. The same holds for some private benefits such as 
financial gains. However, many benefits are in fact conditional on the participation of 
specific other countries. For instance, leaders find it easier to garner domestic support for a 
peacekeeping mission if allies join in. A smaller country may expect to secure foreign policy 
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advantages from contributing to an operation, but only if a major power favors it and supports 
it with troops. Peacekeeping only pushes up standards if peacekeepers operate alongside well 
trained, disciplined troops. Finally, the specific norms that peacekeepers promote are likely to 
depend on what other countries are sending troops. The main contribution of our article is to 
examine the role of political affinity in the decision of countries to provide peacekeepers. 
 
We adapt a model developed by Ballester, Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2006) to deal with 
provision of public goods where there are also jointly-produced private benefits. The model is 
extremely flexible. It can include jointly-produced private benefits that are either independent 
of or dependent on the actions of other states. Dependent benefits can take the form of either 
positive or negative complementarities. In our application of the model, benefit 
complementarities follow from the (dis)similarity of foreign policy preferences within the 
group of countries that provide peacekeepers. Further, the model formulates the relative 
strength of complementarities in terms of network ties between country dyads. A country i is 
more strongly linked with country j in this network to the extent that i’s private benefits go up 
with j’s level of participation. In equilibrium, contributions to peacekeeping are best 
responses given the direct and indirect network ties between countries. The analysis is 
therefore an example of so-called network games (Jackson, 2008; Gallop, 2016; Larson, 
2016). We show that in equilibrium, contributions are proportional to a country’s Bonacich 
centrality in the complementarities network, where a country has a greater Bonacich 
centrality score (Bonacich 1987) if it has more direct and indirect connections with other 
countries. As we elaborate below, such countries are more subject to positive feedback 
effects encouraging them to increase their contributions in response to others (Ballester, 
Calvó-Armengol & Zenou, 2006: 104). 
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The next section reviews the literature on peacekeeping contributions and elaborates why it 
matters for countries to be part of the ‘right’ alliance in providing peacekeepers. Next, we 
present and analyze peacekeeping contribution as a network game. We apply the main result 
that, in equilibrium, contributions are proportional to actor centrality and argue that similarity 
of foreign policy preferences generates a network of complementarities. The fourth section 
reports on the test of the hypothesis that identifies a relationship between proportionate 
contributions to peacekeeping and centrality in this network. There is indeed evidence for the 
prevalence of peacekeeping alongside your ‘friends’. In effect, we find that countries with a 
lot of ‘friends’ contribute more peacekeepers.     
 
Providing blue helmets 
Why would countries care about the contributions made by specific other countries, and how 
does this alter existing explanations for peacekeeping contributions? Research so far is not 
only inconclusive on whether contributions from other countries provide incentives to 
provide peacekeepers (so-called spill-ins), but also on the reasons behind possible spill-ins. In 
our opinion, insufficient attention has been given to the political motives behind 
peacekeeping. 
 
Countries contribute to peacekeeping by providing troops, financial support, or some mixture 
of both. Further, there have been notable changes in the extent and nature of peacekeeping 
since the end of the Cold War. Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu (1999) and Gaibulloev, Sandler & 
Shimizu (2009) observe positive spill-ins for financial contributions made to both UN and 
non-UN missions: in other words, countries provide more financial support if other countries 
also provide financial support. At the same time, Shimizu & Sandler (2002) note that 
financial burden-sharing for peacekeeping has become more uneven in the post-Cold War 
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period, possibly because the benefits from peacekeeping have become more public. They 
argue that the specific financial assessment rules of the UN explain spill-ins for UN PKOs. 
For non-UN PKOs, the spill-ins for financial contributions provide evidence for a willingness 
of countries to take shared responsibility for missions that generate region-specific benefits 
(Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009: 849). 
 
Troop contributions to peacekeeping operations do not follow a similar pattern. Bove & Elia 
(2013: 712) find that country-specific benefits primarily explain contributions with no 
difference between UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations: “developing countries readily 
contribute persons to UN operations for the financial and training benefits that participation 
provides” (2013: 713). Gaibulloev et al. (2015) argue, however, that the decision to 
contribute to UN and non-UN operations differs. They observe spill-ins from contributing to 
non-UN operations, but not for UN PKOs. They claim that UN PKOs provide limited 
opportunity for training, because of the generally poor quality of peacekeeping forces. 
Further, the financial benefits from providing troops, i.e., the difference between the costs of 
deploying peacekeepers and UN reimbursements, are private benefits unrelated to the 
contributions of other countries. 
 
The actual financial gains of providing peacekeepers are however easily overstated (Findlay, 
1996: 9; Bellamy & Williams, 2013: 10). Tellingly, many small developing countries only 
provide small (‘token’) contributions to peacekeeping operations (Coleman, 2013), and 
financial benefits cannot explain the willingness of Austria, Canada, or the Scandinavian 
countries to provide substantial number of peacekeepers. The motivations behind 
peacekeeping often encompass broader policy objectives: Bobrow & Boyer (1997) argue that 
countries get involved in peacekeeping to advance their foreign policy and economic goals. 
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For non-UN missions, Rost & Greig (2011) show that trade ties but also ethnic and colonial 
links, are important in determining whether countries send peacekeepers. Focusing on 
economic interests, Stojek & Tir (2014) show that trade of the five permanent members of the 
UN Security Council with the (post-)conflict country affects whether a peacekeeping mission 
is sent. Beardsley & Schmidt (2012), however, contend that the narrow interests of permanent 
members are less important than the UN’s broader aims.  
 
The motives of democratic countries to provide peacekeepers have received most attention 
(Perkins & Neumayer, 2008). Lebovic (2004) finds that democratic countries contribute more 
troops to UN missions. He explains their greater involvement because of shared liberal 
principles, such as democratic and humanitarian objectives, and a preference for intervening 
multilaterally rather than unilaterally. Lebovic (2004: 914) argues that multilateral operations 
allow democracies to manage risks and costs, to provide scale efficiencies and legitimacy, 
and to realize shared interests. Sotomayor (2014: 29–30) focuses on the contributions of 
democratizing states and argues that their contributions signal a commitment to upholding 
international agreements and (human rights) norms as well as to their new political identity. 
Arguably, the specific content of such signals depends on what other countries also provide 
peacekeepers. The same applies to any effect of participation in peacekeeping on reforming 
the military organizations of newly democratized countries. In fact, Sotomayor finds that 
peacekeeping has only limited impact on transforming civil-military relations when political 
institutions are weak. However, it remains significant that political leaders expect positive 
spillovers from the participation of their military in multilateral peacekeeping operations with 
other democracies.  
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Foreign policy goals supporting the deployment of peacekeepers are not necessarily limited 
to exporting democratic values. For instance, until 1980 China viewed UN peacekeeping as 
an aspect of western imperialism. As its foreign policy and economic goals shifted towards 
multilaterism and integration in the global economy, it has come to support some UN 
peacekeeping operations and has begun to provide troops. Yet it remains wary of US 
involvement and sensitive to what other countries are involved in operations (Choedon, 
2005). 
 
Shared objectives among a group of countries thus provide private benefits and incentivize 
countries to support missions with likeminded countries. Moreover, the incentives are not 
only direct (in the case country i benefits from peacekeeping with country j) but also indirect 
(country i benefits from peacekeeping with countries j and k, because the latter prefer to 
deploy together). In other words, complementarities between policy preferences of countries 
participating in peacekeeping constitute a network. Policy complementarities affect the 
private benefits of countries for a number of reasons. First of all, domestic support may 
depend on whether peacekeeping is done with countries that are considered allies. Secondly, 
the peacekeeping outcome will depend on a shared understanding of the countries in the 
mission regarding its implementation and ultimate objectives. Countries with similar foreign 
policy preferences find it easier to agree on how to carry out peacekeeping. This has become 
particularly important since peacekeeping has developed beyond the provision of a ‘thin blue-
line’ of troops acting as neutral observers. Peacebuilding and peace-enforcement require a 
more encompassing engagement with the conflict situation. Peacekeepers increasingly use 
force against groups threatening to undermine the peace-process or violating human rights. 
Peace-building and peace-enforcement are not necessarily neutral relative to the interests of 
the countries that provide the peacekeepers, because they aim for particular post-conflict 
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institutions and may well favor one side or—more commonly—exclude groups from the 
ultimate settlement. 
 
Peacekeeping failures are obviously costly. As the Srebrenica genocide clearly illustrates, the 
failure of a peacekeeping mission not only affects the civilians caught up in the fighting and 
the UN, but also the country that deployed the peacekeepers—in this case, the Netherlands. 
Peacekeeping failures endanger the troops involved and damage their international 
reputation. Furthermore, the Dutch government was held liable for their (lack of) action. In 
other words, failures have clear domestic and international costs. Disagreement about the 
terms of engagement, lack of coordination among countries involved and disagreement about 
ultimate objectives all contribute to peacekeeping failures. Inversely, successful 
peacekeeping provides reputational and domestic political benefits. 
 
Modeling the provision of peacekeepers as a network game 
We present and analyze peacekeeping contributions as a network game based on Ballester, 
Calvó-Armengol & Zenou’s (2006) and Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini & Zenou (2009). For 
our purposes the most important feature of the model is that it captures the idea that a country 
i’s private-goods benefits from peacekeeping depend not only on whether it acts, but also on 
whether it does so alongside some other country j. Positive (negative) complementarities 
exist if i’s private benefits increase (decrease) the more j contributes. The empirical section 
links the size of such complementarities to the similarity of foreign policy preferences 
between two countries. Accordingly, the network game analyzes the role of homophily in 
determining the discretionary international network defined by joint peacekeeping (Maoz & 
Joyce, 2016) 
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Social network analysis is no longer limited to its original sociological interpretation, where it 
dealt with ties associated with social relations. In fact all relationships can constitute a 
network (Jackson 2008). Accordingly, networks constituted by preference similarity sit well 
alongside other networks used in international relations theory in recent years such as 
alliance, trade, and IGO networks (Hafner-Burton, Kahler & Montgomery, 2009). Indeed, the 
effects of such networks on conflict and cooperation may depend on them generating 
convergence in preferences (Dorussen & Ward, 2008; 2010). 
 
THE MODEL Consider that there are n countries, where country i’s contribution to 
peacekeeping is denoted by xi ≥ 0. Country i’s utility is a function of the contributions of 
each country (j ≠ i) in the system: 
, , ⋯ , , ⋯ , 	
 =  + ∑   +  +



 + ∑    (1) 
The first term represents country i’s gains from total production of the public good, which are 
linear in i’s contributions and the sum of contributions of all other states assuming α ≥ 0. The 
second term represents private benefits that depend exclusively on i’s contributions; for 
example, in the case of poorer countries, the difference between the costs of deployment and 
UN payments. We assume that such private benefits exist, or π > 0. The third term represents 
i’s costs of peacekeeping, where for all countries i, σii = σ < 0. Taking the first three terms 
together, i’s payoffs are strictly concave in its effort. Moreover, the assumption is that the 
three terms are the same for all countries.2 The fourth term represents complementarities in 
the joint production of private goods. If σij > 0, there is a positive complementarity whereby 
i’s private goods from peacekeeping increase with j’s efforts. If σij < 0, the complementarity 
is negative and i’s private benefits from peacekeeping decrease with j’s efforts.  
 
  
 12
It is useful to re-arrange (1) so that the costs of peacekeeping are grouped together with any 
disincentives to contribute due to negative complementarities from other countries’ efforts. 
For this we need some additional notation. Let 	 =  ≠  and  =
  ≠ . Assume that σii < min{σmin , 0}, so that i’s payoffs are concave in its own 
effort (σii < 0). If σmin < 0, i’s marginal returns to its own effort decrease at least as fast as the 
component of its private returns related to complementarities with j, which seems appropriate 
as long as the negative marginal effects of the actions of others on i’s private benefits are not 
too large. Set ! = −#	, 0% ≥ 0, ' =  + !, and assume that λ > 0, ensuring that 
there are at least some countries whose private benefits increase with their effort. Finally, set 
( =  − ! '⁄  for j ≠ i and ( = 0. The term gij is σij normed to be on the interval [0,1] 
and represents the relative strength of complementarities that increase i’s incentives to 
contribute to peacekeeping as j’s contribution increases. Adapting Ballester, Calvó-Armengol 
& Zenou (2006), (1) can be re-arranged as: 
  
, , ⋯ , , ⋯ , 	
 =  + ∑   +  −


* − !

 − !∑ 
	
+ +
'∑ (
	
+ 	 (2) 
 
EQUILIBRIUM CONTRIBUTIONS Terms gij can be thought of as entries in an (nXn) 
adjacency matrix representing a network. If gij = gji, the network is symmetric, but this is not 
a necessary assumption. In effect the network gives the relative complementarities in 
producing private goods via peacekeeping jointly with other countries. Ballester, Calvó-
Armengol & Zenou (2006, 1408) show that under certain assumptions a game with the same 
best-reply functions as ours has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium.3 Because the 
equilibriums of two games with the same best-reply functions must be identical, it is possible 
to make use of their result: in equilibrium the relative contributions, in this case to 
  
 13
peacekeeping, are proportional to Bonacich centrality in the network of relative 
complementarities just discussed.  
 
There exists an intuitive account of the conditions under which this result holds. For a valued 
graph Freeman centrality is the sum of the value of edges incident on a node i. Central nodes 
are well connected compared to others. Bonacich centrality further takes into account the 
centrality of nodes that i is connected to: connections to more central nodes are regarded as 
being more valuable. A path in a valued graph between i and j is a sequence of edges between 
successive nodes with value greater than zero, where the sequence of nodes starts with i and 
ends with j. The value of a path is the sum of the relevant edges. The Bonacich centrality of 
node i sums the value of all path from i to other nodes and from i to itself (so-called ‘loops’). 
Bonacich centrality discounts longer paths by an attenuation factor raised to the power of the 
number of edges in the path. Ballester, Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2006: 1408) show that λ 
represents the attenuation factor, where in this case λ > 0. It is reasonable to expect that σmax > 
0, i.e., there is at least one dyad where the positive complementarities in joint production of 
private benefits outweigh the disincentives to contribute because of free riding.  
 
The conditions under which this game has no pure strategy equilibrium also provide insight. 
Assuming λ > 0, increased contributions made by one country encourage others to contribute 
more, because of jointly-produced private goods. Feedback effects through the network of 
(relative) complementarities trigger further increases in contributions. Unless restrained by 
increases in the costs of contributing (represented by the second term in 2), these feedback 
effects become boundless, so that contributions keep on expanding. In other words, an 
equilibrium only exists if the positive feedback effects are not too great relative to the costs of 
contributing to peacekeeping; in other words, λ must not be too great. 
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Heuristically, it is further useful to consider how shocks may increase contributions of a 
country i. Assume that the first order effect of a shock is to encourage a country (j) with 
foreign-policy preferences similar to i to do more. Increased contributions of j in turn 
encourage other countries with preferences similar to j to contribute more peacekeepers. We 
can imagine the effect of the shock rippling outward from i, and eventually even being 
“reflected back” to i along paths in the network. The attenuation factor mentioned above 
ensures that, like ripples on a pond caused by dropping in a stone with waves being reflected 
back from the edges, the feedback effects gradually die down as they travel through the 
numerous paths in the network. In equilibrium contributions are proportional to Bonacich 
centrality because a country with a centrally located policy preferences is located on many 
paths, so it is more subject to these positive feedback effects as they move backwards and 
forwards through the network. 
 
Thus in our context, the Bonacich centrality represents the degree to which a country i is 
motivated to contribute because contributions of other countries increase its private benefits. 
The measure allows not only for first-order effects (direct links in the network) but also for 
second and higher order feedbacks (longer paths in the network). The attenuation factor λ 
relates to how much a country responds to these feedback effects. So a country’s equilibrium 
contribution (supposing there is one) increases with the direct and indirect effects of others’ 
contributions on its own private goods from peacekeeping. This seems intuitively appealing, 
but to move beyond pure theory to testable hypotheses requires auxiliary assumptions about 
when positive complementarities exist between members of a dyad. 
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HYPOTHESIS We focus on similarity of foreign policy preferences as a reason for why 
contributions to peacekeeping operation may have positive or negative complementarities: if i 
and j have similar foreign policy preferences, each gets higher private-goods payoffs from 
participating in peacekeeping when the other is involved. We have already provided a 
number of plausible reasons, such as increased domestic support for acting alongside like-
mined countries. If the views of countries i and j on foreign policy are more similar (or 
positively correlated), country j should support a proposal by country i in international 
forums. On the other hand, if their views are more dissimilar (or negatively correlated), the 
countries are unlikely to support each other’s proposals. Countries with similar foreign policy 
preferences strive to achieve compatible objectives during the implementation of the mission 
and be more likely to support each other’s peacekeepers. The expected private benefits from 
mission success should increase as well as potential losses from mission failure should 
decrease when operating with like-minded countries. Further, these benefits increase if 
countries with similar policy views contribute more peacekeepers. 
 
Several measures of the degree of similarity of foreign policy preferences exist. Generally 
these reflect positive or negative correlations between voting behavior in the UN. Allen and 
Yuen (2014) use this approach to control for whether similarity of preferences between 
permanent members of the UN Security Council and states where peacekeeping missions take 
place affect the mandate under which peacekeeping occurs. To generate a network G of 
relative complementarities of the sort required by the theory, we rescale the measure of 
similarity of foreign policy preferences (mij) to lie on the interval [0,1], so ( = - , where 

-
 is the normed measure of preference similarity. This allows us to test the following 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis: Other things being equal, the proportion of troops a country contributes to the 
overall numbers involved in a UN peacekeeping mission increases with its Bonacich 
centrality in network G. 
 
Data and research design 
The analysis includes data on 35 UN peacekeeping missions between 1990 and 2011, where 
the units are country contributions to a mission in a particular year. We analyze contributions 
of military personnel. Countries retain control over the decision to contribute troops, and 
contributions accordingly vary from year to year. Military personnel make up the main part 
(approximately 90%) of all peacekeepers and limiting attention to military contributions 
reduces the impact of countries with only token contributions on the analysis. We only 
consider contributions to UN PKOs, because the domain of non-UN missions remains 
unclear encompassing regional peacekeeping but also military interventions. The theoretical 
model and key hypothesis predict the proportion of troops instead of the absolute number of 
troops contributed to a mission. The dependent variable is defined accordingly. The 
proportion of contributions (prop_troops) is the contributions of a country to a particular 
mission in a given year divided by total number of troops participating in that particular 
mission in the year concerned. 
 
The measure of complementarities of foreign policy preferences draws on recent work by 
Bailey, Strezhnev & Voeten (2015). UN General Assembly roll-call data are used commonly 
to generate dyadic measures of preference similarity using a correlational approach 
(Signorino & Ritter, 1999). Bailey, Strezhnev & Voeten (2015) estimate cut-points applying 
methods used to position legislators on a left-right dimension. An advantage of their approach 
is that it provides a context-free positional measure, independent from the set of issues under 
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discussion. To ensure independence from the agenda, Bailey, Strezhnev & Voeten (2015) 
further anchor their scale on votes taken over identically worded resolutions that have 
appeared repeatedly on the General Assembly agenda. They provide an ideal-point position 
for each session for each member state with a delegation in that session. The positions do not 
capture all relevant foreign policy differences; e.g., India, Bangladesh and Pakistan on 
average have very similar scores over the period of our study, despite regional hostilities. 
However, it is widely accepted that UN voting data is the best available proxy. 
 
We use the ideal-point positions to create a measure of policy similarity for each pair of 
countries for each year and to calculate country centrality in the network of policy 
complementarities. Policy similarity is the inverse of policy dissimilarity where the latter is 
calculated as the absolute difference between the ideal-point positions of two countries for 
any year. Policy dissimilarity is normed to fall between 0 and 1 by subtracting the minimum 
difference for that year and dividing by the difference between the maximum and minimum 
values. (Normed) dissimilarity is inverted by subtracting the score from 1. Next, we apply the 
measure for policy similarity to a valued network with all countries as nodes and edges 
having higher scores the more similar the dyad’s preferences.  
 
The analysis uses eigenvalue rather than Bonacich centrality. Bonacich centrality allows for 
the specification of an attenuation factor and an exogenous vector of factors influencing the 
importance of a node in the network (Bonacich, 1987; Bonacich & Lloyd, 2001). However, 
when capturing preference similarity, there is no good theoretical reason to include 
exogenous factors. As discussed above, Ballester, Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2006) specify 
the relevant attenuation factor as λ = σmax + γ. Unfortunately, we cannot directly estimate the 
relevant preference parameters on which the attenuation factor depends. Instead we calculate 
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eigenvalue centrality scores using Miura’s (2012) Stata ado-files. In effect, in our analysis 
the attenuation factor corresponds to the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue, and to make this 
clear we call our main independent variable eigen.  
 
Figure 1 shows how policy complementarities (eigen centrality) vary with a country’s policy 
position (ideal_point). Notable is that countries with ideal point around zero have higher 
centrality scores. This is intuitive: eigen takes account not only of how many countries are 
near, but also how many states those countries are near to, and so on. The distribution of ideal 
points is bimodal, but each mode is quite near the zero point. It follows that countries with an 
ideal point near the center are located close to a lot of other countries also located near each 
other. Countries with more extreme ideal points are located close to fewer countries, either in 
direct terms or along indirect paths.  
                                                        (Figure 1 about here.) 
 
Recognizing this regularity in the data, our hypothesis amounts to the idea that countries that 
share policy preference with ideologically moderate countries provide higher proportions of 
peacekeepers than ideologically extreme ones, other things equal. They are likely to stand 
alongside other ideologically moderate countries in peacekeeping operations.  
 
Our model proposes jointly-produced private benefits as an explanation for this regularity. A 
possible alternative explanation might be that ideologically moderate countries are more 
likely to set the objectives of peacekeeping missions compared to ideologically extreme ones.    
The UN decision-making procedures for peacekeeping operations do not necessarily favor 
moderate countries, since missions are not decided by majority rule of all UN members. 
Instead, decisions are made in the Security Council where each permanent member has a 
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veto, and the distribution of their preferences does not necessarily mirror that of the whole 
membership.  
 
CONTROL VARIABLES The theory and hypothesis introduced above focus on proportionate 
contributions in equilibrium. Existing empirical work tends to explain the (absolute) number 
of troops contributed to peacekeeping missions, and doesn’t necessarily provide guidance for 
our empirical models. Large absolute contributions can give moderate proportionate 
contributions in the case of big missions. Bove & Elia (2011), for example, find that troop 
contributions correlate with conflict intensity and number of displaced persons. Yet if this 
applies likewise to all countries considering sending peacekeepers, then these variables would 
not affect the proportion of troops sent by any particular country. In the light of this we start 
with a relatively sparse baseline model. 
 
A possible explanation for the high contributions of countries like Bangladesh, India and 
Pakistan could be that the UN pays a fixed amount per peacekeeper (Bove & Elia, 2011). It is 
thus important to control for the impact of UN reimbursements on troop contributions. It is 
not easy to find a proxy, but especially poorer developing countries can use revenues from 
UN peacekeeping to fund their military. Assuming that the price of a soldier positively 
correlates with general real income levels, we use real GDP per capita (at year 2000 prices) 
(rgdp_pc). As an alternative proxy for the price of providing a soldier, we take the ratio of 
total military expenditures to the number of military personnel, mil_per_sold. The coverage 
of mil_per_sold is limited due to availability of data on military expenditure and troop 
numbers. 
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Countries are likely to have stronger security and economic interests in nearby countries 
providing them with private incentives to contribute towards peacekeeping in these countries. 
Further, it is also less costly to deploy troops regionally (Perkins & Neumayer, 2008; Bove & 
Elia, 2011). All models control for weighted distance (dist_w): a measure of the distance 
between two countries using the distances between urban agglomerations in each country and 
weighted by the population of these agglomerations (Mayer & Zignago, 2011).4  
 
The empirical models include some plausible additional controls. Democracies are more 
likely to supply peacekeepers (Perkins & Neumayer, 2008), so we include the 21-point Polity 
democracy score of the contributing nation, polity2. The permanent five members of the 
Security Council (China, France, Russia, UK, and USA) have a veto power over the 
authorization of UN PKO, and thus we include dummies for each of the five members 
separately. The US dummy (USA) also reflects the hegemonic position of the USA during 
this period. On-going commitments to other peacekeeping missions (num_missions) may 
constrain the ability of countries to deploy peacekeepers to further missions, but could also 
measure a general commitment to UN peacekeeping.  
 
Historical colonial links have been suggested as a factor for peacekeeping (Perkins & 
Neumayer, 2008). The dummy col45 takes on the value 1 if the nation contributing troops 
had a colonial relationship in the post 1945 period with the country where the mission was 
being carried out. Further, comcol indicates if the countries in dyad were subject to a 
common colonizer in this period (Mayer & Zignago, 2011). Exploratory analysis suggests 
that smaller countries are less likely to provide peacekeepers for operations in bigger 
countries: we include the ratio of the populations of the country providing troops to the 
population of the country where the mission was taking place, ratio_pop. 
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Countries more embedded in the normative order of the world system post-1945 could be 
more likely to contribute to peacekeeping. Previously, we have argued that countries central 
to the co-affiliation network generated by membership of IGOs are more open to normative 
pressure from other countries (Dorussen & Ward, 2008). While (Freeman) centrality in the 
trade network could capturing a country’s overall stake in maintaining world trade (Dorussen 
& Ward, 2010). Accordingly, in further robustness tests, we control for IGO and trade 
centrality. 
 
Results 
Figure 2 provides a visual impression of the relationship between policy centrality (eigen) 
and the proportion of the total number of troops deployed in a mission/year contributed by a 
country, prop_troop. Even though our theory suggests a linear relationship between these two 
variables, empirically the relationship seems positive but non-linear. Figure 2 displays the 
country labels for the top-twenty contributors. Discernable is the high proportion of troops 
provided by India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Fiji. It is interesting to note that these countries 
also have relatively high scores on eigen. Financial incentives and policy complementarities 
are thus possibly competing explanations. Among countries with low scores on eigen, the 
USA stands out in having relatively high contributions. Bailey, Strezhnev & Voeten (2015) 
interpret their scale as measuring the degree to which countries support the US-led liberal 
international order, with low scores representing disagreement with this order. Many of 
countries with low eigen-scores generally fail to contribute to peacekeeping.5 Even countries 
with high eigen-scores often do not contribute in a particular year, but only countries with 
moderate to high scores on eigen (higher than approximately .05) contribute anything—the 
UK and the USA are the exceptions to the rule. Finally, there is considerable variation in 
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countries’ contributions for higher values on the eigen, suggesting that a range of other 
factors could be at work. 
(Figure 2 about here.) 
 
A difference of means test allows us to explore whether policy preferences of contributors to 
UN PKOs tend to cluster. The mean absolute difference between ideal points of a random 
sample of a thousand pairs of countries equals 1.14 (with a standard deviation: 0.88). 
Drawing a sample of thousand pairs of countries that participate in the same peacekeeping 
operation in a given year yields 0.97 as the mean difference of ideal points (standard 
deviation: 0.81). We test the one-sided hypothesis that the mean is lower for the random 
peacekeeping sample compared to the sample of all countries. The difference of means 
between ideal points in the peacekeeping sample is indeed significantly lower (p < .000) then 
would be expected at random. However, we also note that the difference is quite small in 
substantive terms given the standard deviation of ideal points.     
 
The first regression in Table I provides the baseline model. Model 1 includes eigenvalue 
centrality (eigen) to capture the complementarities in foreign policy positions. It also includes 
the squared term of eigenvalue centrality (eigen2) to capture possible non-linearities 
suggested by Figure 2. The model further includes wealth (rgdp_pc) as well as weighted 
distances (dist_w) to control for private financial incentives to provide peacekeepers as well 
as the salience of regional instability. It is reasonable to expect that countries maintain their 
commitment to a particular PKO for a number of years. The Woolridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data confirms the need to control for autocorrelation (prob > F = 
.000). Accordingly, the models give GLS estimates allowing for an AR(1) process. Model 1 
further assumes random effects for contributing country, mission and year.  
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In Model 1, policy complementarities as measured by both centrality terms are (marginally) 
significant suggesting a non-linear relation. A possible explanation is that payoff 
complementarities are not linear with the closeness of preferences of any two countries but 
exhibit declining marginal utility. If so, as observed, the marginal increase in prop_troop with 
eigen should be declining. Countries contribute a lower proportion of peacekeepers if they are 
located further—using population weighted distance, dist_w—from the location of the 
mission. In Model 1, however, the effect of wealth (rgdp_pc) is not significant.  
 
Model 2 (Table I) includes (contributor) country fixed effects. Here, both eigenvalue policy 
centrality variables are significant at least at the 99% level. Countries contribute a larger 
proportion of peacekeepers is they are more centrally located in the policy-preference 
network, but the effect is non-linear. In the fixed-effects estimation, the coefficient of 
rgdp_pc is negative and marginally significant suggesting that poorer countries have financial 
incentives to provide peacekeepers. The coefficient of distance (dist_w) is largely unaffected. 
(Table I about here) 
 
Model 3 (Table I) returns to the random-effects specification but includes a number of 
additional controls, some of which are (largely) time invariant. In the immediate post-Cold 
War period, the USA held a special position, and Figure 2 further suggests it is an outlier in 
the centrality relationship. Democracies are more likely to supply peacekeepers (Perkins & 
Neumayer, 2008), perhaps because they benefit more from supporting a democratic world 
order. Historical colonial linkages may contribute to peacekeeping, while smaller countries 
are less likely to provide peacekeepers for operations in bigger countries, ratio_pop. We also 
control for country involvement in concurrent missions (num_missions). In Model 3, the 
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policy complementarities support the central hypothesis and remain highly significant. 
Wealth (rgdp_pc) and distance (dist_w) retain their level of significance. The other controls 
are all significant and, apart from number of missions, in the expected direction. We find that 
countries contribute a larger proportion of troops if they are simultaneously deploying to 
other missions. Rather than indicating a possible constraint, the variable seems to register a 
general willingness to engage with UN peacekeeping. Regardless of our uncertainty about the 
correct interpretation, because the coefficient is highly significant, we retain it as a control in 
all models to avoid omitted variable bias. Compared to Models 1 and 2, we lose about 8,000 
observations (about 14%) in the third model.  
 
Based on Model 3, we calculate the average estimated effect of policy complementarities 
(eigenvalue centrality) across contributing countries and over time by changing eigen from its 
empirically minimum to maximum value. Policy complementarities increase prop_troops 
with about 0.6 of a standard deviation. Since on average the UN force size was around 2635 
in a given year per mission, this means that shifting eigen from its minimum to maximum 
value increases a country’s contribution to an ‘average’ mission with approximately 50 
troops. These calculations suggest a substantively modest but non-negligible effect from the 
motive to engage in peacekeeping alongside friends. Coleman (2013, 48) observes that 
relatively small, or token, contribution to UN PKOs are increasingly commonplace: “220 of 
the 322 national troop contributions deployed in UN peacekeeping operations in August 2011 
were token contributions comprising less than forty military personnel,” and “[t]he vast 
majority of these portfolios suggest that token troop contributions represent a deliberate 
strategy to spread a state’s military resources over more multilateral operation” (50). The 
non-linear effect of policy complementarities does not greatly alter the overall interpretation 
of the model. In Model 3, the effect of policy complementarities is maximized when eigen 
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equals approximately .07. Here, the maximum substantive effect of policy complementarities 
equals about 55 troops, and the impact of any non-linear decrease is thus 5 troops at most. 
 
Model 4 presents a random effects model with additional time-invariant predictors as 
suggested by Bell and Jones (2015). The model distinguishes the effects of over-time and 
cross-sectional variation of relevant variables. For each on the country-mission panels, any 
within effects are based on the difference between the yearly observation and the panel mean 
( − ./ ), while the between effect is based on the panel mean (./ ).6  With this 
transformation within and between effects can be consistently estimated together (Bell & 
Jones, 2015: 144–7). Notably, the within (over-time) effect of eigenvalue centrality remains 
significant, while the between (across country-mission) effect is now insignificant. If policy 
complementarities increase over time, countries become more willing to deploy troops to a 
particular mission, while policy complementarities are less important to explain differences in 
country willingness to contribute peacekeepers more generally across missions. A possible 
explanation is that countries respond to the participation of likeminded countries to specific 
missions rather than the latters’ general engagement in UN PKOs. Democracy and population 
size are no longer significant when distinguishing between and within panel effects. In 
contrast, both with within and between effects of concurrent number of missions remain 
significant at 99%, making it more plausible that the variable registers a general willingness 
to engage with UN peacekeeping.  The coefficients of wealth and the purely time invariant 
variables are unaffected. 
 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS The significance of policy complementarities is robust for a number of 
further specifications, see Tables II and III. The dependent variable prop_troop is heavily 
skewed to the left, because many countries do not contribute to particular missions. The 
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variable is also censored at zero and one, making the distribution the error term non-normal. 
Further, strictly speaking the formal model does not predict zero contributions. Table II 
replicates the models presented in Table I, but drops all cases where a country never 
contributes to a particular mission. The dependent variable is log transformed to correct for 
the left-skew and non-normal distribution of errors.7 The qualitative impact of these changes 
to the main results is minor. Policy complementarities remain significant in Models 5 – 7, as 
does the within-panel effect in Model 8. The effects of the control variables are also largely 
robust even though there is a considerable loss of degrees of freedom with only 6,000 cases 
(about 10%) retained.   
(Table II about here) 
 
Table III presents a number of alternative model specifications based on Model 3 (Table I). 
As an alternative proxy for the price of providing a soldier, we take the ratio of a country’s 
military expenditures to the number of its military personnel, mil_per_sold, as a measure of 
the cost to contributing countries. In Model 9 (Table III), mil_per_sold has the anticipated 
sign, but is insignificant. Due to limited availability of data on military expenditure and troop 
numbers, the regression loses about 20,000 observations (40%). Since all five permanent 
members of the Security Council must sanction (or at least not veto) a UN peacekeeping 
operation, Model 10 controls for each permanent member. Only the coefficient for the USA 
is significant. Model 11 explores whether policy positions rather than complementarities 
matter. Notably, there is no empirical support that countries with moderate spatial ideal 
points contribute a higher proportion of troops. The coefficients for the other variables 
(including policy complementarities) are unaffected by including these further controls. 
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Finally, it may be reasonable to expect that countries contribute more to peacekeeping if they 
are more embedded in normative order underlying the post WW II world system. Model 12 
includes centrality in the IGO and trade networks. Contrary to expectations, the coefficients 
of centrality in the IGO network and centrality in trade are negative and only the latter is 
significant when added. Their inclusion reduces the significance of policy complementarities 
(especially eigen2) but not the significance of the other coefficients. Again there is some loss 
of degrees of freedom due to limited time coverage of the trade and IGO data, but estimates 
remain largely stable.8  
 
Conclusions 
UN PKOs are increasingly composed of troops from multiple countries, and we expect 
countries to care about the coalition of countries involved in a particular peacekeeping 
mission. The ‘coalition’ has an important say in the direction of the mission and the 
probability of success and risks of failure. All of this affects the reputation of the troops and 
governments of the countries involved both internationally and domestically. Peacekeeping 
has become a jointly-produced good. Using the framework of games on networks, 
specifically the model of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol & Zenou’s (2006), we analyze the effect 
of complementarities in foreign policy preference on the willingness to provide peacekeepers. 
The key insight is that countries provide a larger proportion of peacekeepers to a particular 
mission if they are more central in a network of policy preferences. In effect, countries that 
are more centrally located are closer to more countries that are then also closer to many other 
countries. Importantly, centrality in this network matters and not simply holding moderate 
policy preferences. 
 
  
 28
Policy complementarities are an understudied motivation for peacekeeping contributions. 
Most explanations have either focused on peace and security as public benefits or, 
alternatively, on private (financial) motives. Empirically, we show that policy 
complementarities matter. Moreover, the significance of centrality of the network of policy 
preferences is robust. An important qualification is that the theory suggests a linear 
relationship whereas we observe a quadratic, non-linear one between eigen and prop_troop. 
Substantially, comparing a poorly connected (extreme) country with a highly connected 
(centrally located) country makes a differences of about 50 to 55 military personnel to a UN 
PKO in a given year. Although this may seem minor, it encompasses the majority of 
contributions made to UN peacekeeping missions.  
 
Notably, the policy complementarities among the group of contributor countries do not 
conform a US based liberal-peace model. In fact, the USA is an outlier contributing more to 
UN PKOs than would be expected based on their foreign policy positions. Countries that 
contribute to peacekeeping generally share more moderate policies positions, and we show 
that these shared preferences motivate them to contribute to peacekeeping. In practice and on 
the ground, UN peacekeeping therefore may not be the pinnacle of liberal peace building, but 
rather a collective response of a coalition of countries that perceive a common interest to 
intervene in a particular situation. In other words, countries wish to stand alongside their 
friends when they engage in peacekeeping.  
 
Data replication 
An on-line Appendix with further robustness tests as well as the dataset, codebook, and do-
files for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets. 
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Table I. Proportionate contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping operations, 1990 – 
2011, GLS models with AR(1) disturbances 
prop_troops Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Policy complementarities    
eigen 4.27e-01 1.04e+00 1.41e+00  
 (1.76) † (3.43)** (3.30)**  
eigen (within)    1.89e+00 
    (3.34)** 
eigen (between)    9.14e-01 
    (1.27) 
eigen2 -3.63e+00 -7.74e+00 -9.57e+00  
 (2.04)* (3.56)** (3.19)**  
eigen2 (within)    -1.25e+01 
    (3.24)** 
eigen2 (between)    -6.09e+00 
    (1.17) 
Wealth (rgdppc) -2.25e-08 -1.05e-07 -5.65e-08  
 (0.82) (1.95)† (1.74)†  
rgdppc  (within)    -1.14e-07 
    (1.70) † 
rgdppc (between)    -6.49e-08 
    (1.66) † 
Democracy (polity2)   1.30e-04  
   (2.71)**  
polity2 (within)    7.82e-05 
    (1.11) 
polity2 (between)    4.55e-05 
    (0.69) 
Population (ratio_pop)   1.75e-05  
   (2.08)*  
ratio_pop (within)    6.95e-05 
    (1.20) 
ratio_pop (between)    7.23e-06 
    (0.85) 
Missions    4.02e-03  
(num_missions)   (20.40)**  
num_missions (within)    3.22e-03 
    (14.83)** 
num_missions     7.78e-03 
(between)    (16.81)** 
USA   2.70e-02 2.06e-02 
   (4.04)** (2.41)* 
Distance (distw) -2.39e-07 -3.86e-07 -2.44e-07 -2.01e-07 
 (2.88)** (3.72)** (2.47)* (1.99)* 
Common colonizers   4.23e-03 3.88e-03 
(comcol)   (2.75)** (2.52)* 
Colonial link (col45)   3.65e-02 3.27e-02 
   (6.04)** (5.40)** 
Constant -6.24e-03 -2.80e-02 -4.86e-02 -3.24e-02 
 (0.75) (2.39)* (3.17)** (1.30) 
N 53,669 53,669 45,678 45,678 
Country Fixed Effects No Yes No No 
Rho .52 .52 .52 .52 
R2 (overall) .001 .06 .04 .04 
Notes: z-scores in parentheses;  † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table II. Proportionate contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping operations, 1990 – 
2011, GLS models with AR(1) disturbances (excluding zero contributions) 
ln_prop_troop Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Policy complementarities    
eigen 3.99e+02 1.22e+03 7.11e+02  
 (3.67)** (5.60)** (3.84)**  
eigen (within)    6.43e+02 
    (3.02)** 
eigen (between)    6.44e+02 
    (1.60) 
eigen2 -3.46e+03 -9.30e+03 -4.95e+03  
 (4.18)** (6.10)** (3.74)**  
eigen2 (within)    -4.44e+03 
    (2.96)** 
eigen2 (between)    -4.71e+03 
    (1.60) 
Wealth (rgdppc) -3.20e-05 4.09e-05 -2.18e-06  
 (2.57)* (1.55) (0.17)  
rgdppc  (within)    4.02e-05 
    (1.48) 
rgdppc (between)    -2.18e-05 
    (1.31) 
Democracy (polity2)   5.03e-02  
   (2.22)*  
polity2 (within)    8.66e-02 
    (2.88)** 
polity2 (between)    2.22e-02 
    (0.65) 
Population (ratio_pop)   -1.25e-03  
   (0.80)  
ratio_pop (within)    -9.72e-03 
    (0.93) 
ratio_pop (between)    -1.09e-03 
    (0.69) 
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Missions    1.44e+00  
(num_missions)   (28.52)**  
num_missions (within)    1.56e+00 
    (27.40)** 
num_missions     9.02e-01 
(between)    (7.93)** 
USA   8.54e+00 7.26e+00 
   (3.88)** (1.81) † 
Distance (distw) -6.19e-05 -2.60e-04 -1.22e-04 -9.62e-05 
 (1.54) (4.63)** (3.16)** (2.46)* 
Common colonizers   2.11e+00 2.20e+00 
(comcol)   (4.06)** (4.17)** 
Colonial link (col45)   2.98e+00 3.03e+00 
   (2.74)** (2.71)** 
Constant -2.10e+01 -4.84e+01 -3.83e+01 -3.37e+01 
 (5.70)** (6.40)** (5.87)** (2.44)* 
N 6,040 6,040 5,890 5,890 
Country Fixed Effects No Yes No No 
Rho .51 .51 .50 .50 
R2 (overall) .01 .12 .16 .17 
Notes: z-scores in parentheses; † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
  
  
 40
Table III. Proportionate contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping operations, 1990 – 
2011, GLS models with AR(1) disturbances. Robustness checks 
prop_troops Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Policy 
complementarities 
    
eigen 1.50e+00 1.34e+00 1.68e+00 1.04e+00 
 (3.01)** (3.06)** (3.79)** (2.01)* 
eigen2 -9.78e+00 -9.13e+00 -1.06e+01 -6.97e+00 
 (2.81)** (2.97)** (3.50)** (1.94)† 
Policy position   2.42e-03  
(abs_idealpoint)   (2.40)*  
Wealth (rgdppc)  -5.52e-08 -5.26e-08 -3.57e-08 
  (1.69)† (1.61) (0.86) 
Deployment costs -4.48e-09    
(mil_per_sold) (1.48)    
Democracy  1.64e-04 1.22e-04 1.55e-04 2.48e-04 
(polity2) (3.01)** (2.55)* (3.18)** (4.25)** 
Population  1.89e-05 2.28e-05 1.67e-05 2.12e-05 
(ratio_pop) (2.06)* (2.48)* (1.98)* (2.21)* 
Distance (distw) -2.87e-07 -2.35e-07 -2.26e-07 -3.40e-07 
 (2.57)* (2.38)* (2.28)* (2.98)** 
Missions  4.54e-03 4.05e-03 4.04e-03 5.42e-03 
(num_missions) (19.66)** (20.46)** (20.48)** (22.14)** 
USA 3.08e-02 2.57e-02 2.80e-02 5.35e-02 
 (4.05)** (3.76)** (4.18)** (5.19)** 
UK  -9.54e-05   
  (0.02)   
Russia  6.71e-03   
  (1.37)   
China  -8.08e-03   
  (1.53)   
France  -7.11e-03   
  (1.41)   
Common colonizers 5.25e-03 4.16e-03 4.15e-03 5.01e-03 
(comcol) (2.98)** (2.70)** (2.69)** (2.75)** 
Colonial link  3.64e-02 3.81e-02 3.65e-02 4.10e-02 
(col45) (5.48)** (6.03)** (6.04)** (5.80)** 
IGO centrality    -5.31e-07 
    (1.93)† 
Trade centrality    -1.42e-08 
    (3.36)** 
Constant -5.37e-02 -4.58e-02 -6.42e-02 -3.33e-02 
 (3.02)** (2.90)** (3.86)** (1.79)† 
N 34,481 45,678 45,678 32,073 
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Rho .37 .52 .52 .33 
R2 .04 .04 .04 .05 
Notes: z-scores in parentheses; † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Figure 1. Eigen centrality scores by policy ideal point, 1990-2011. 
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Figure 2. Proportionate contribution to UN peacekeeping per mission/year and eigen centrality. 
 
  
  
 44
 
                                                          
1
 Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has increasingly intervened in 
order to contain intra- and interstate conflict using a variety of approaches. In this special 
issue, Böhmelt (2016) uses network analysis to study mediation, while Wilson, Davis & 
Murdie (2016) examine the relevances of networks of nongovernmental organizations in 
peacebuilding. 
2
 Ballester, Calvó-Armengol & Zenou (2006) show how their results generalize if this 
assumption is relaxed.  
3
 As i’s payoffs are strictly concave in its own efforts, the first-order condition defines i’s best 
reply; our game has the same best reply functions as that of Ballester, Calvó-Armengol & 
Zenou (2006), setting α + π equal to the constant in their model that scales contributions into 
benefits dependent only on i’s actions. This holds because of our assumption that i’s benefits 
from the public good are linear in j’s contributions. The linearity assumption is reasonable if 
the difference country i makes to overall collective security is not too great. 
4
 We have also run spatial OLS models using a spatial lag over country troop contributions 
conditioned via policy complementarities. These spatial lags are positive, but not consistently 
significant across models. Most importantly, our central findings (for eigen and eigen2) are 
robust. Results in the on-line Appendix. 
5
 The empirical models presented below exclude countries that do not contribute to any PKO, 
which reduces the impact of lack of contributions by extreme countries. 
6
 Note that in Model 4 the time-invariant (‘fixed’) effects are country-mission specific, while 
Model 2 controls for country fixed-effects. 
7
 The models include cases where countries do not contribute troops to some years of a 
particular mission; in these cases, a minimal contribution was assumed in order to calculate 
ln_prop_troops. The on-line Appendix gives the results for excluding all zero contributions. 
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8
 The on-line Appendix provides additional robustness tests. 
